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Hurricanes are a fact of life on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Residents
who choose to live on the coast accept this risk with the expectation that
their homeowners insurance will cover any damage that a hurricane may
cause. They pay their premiums and depend on their insurance to provide
for their needs if the worst should happen. Conversely, insurance compa-
nies base their business on uncorrelated risk, choosing not to cover the
potentially devastating losses of catastrophic events such as hurricanes. If
unable to avoid these types of risks, the insurance market suffers economic
consequences, which are passed along to consumers.
As a consequence of these opposing dynamics, insurance companies
often include terms and provisions in their policies intending to avoid cov-
erage for the exact type of loss that the policy purchaser fears and hopes
will be protected. The homeowners may not even be aware of these provi-
sions or their intended results until, faced with the devastation of a hurri-
cane, they file a claim that is denied. At this time of extreme need, the
insureds discover that their policy does not meet their expectations or pro-
vide necessary relief. Because the policy-holder and the insurance com-
pany disagree on the meanings of the terms and provisions and the type of
coverage provided, the court becomes the ultimate interpreter of the
policy.
The Corbans and United Services Automobile Association ("USAA")
faced this situation in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina when the Cor-
bans' home was severely damaged and USAA denied their claim based on
a provision in the policy called the anti-concurrent causation clause. The
case turned upon the issue of causation-specifically whether wind, water,
or a combination of the two perils caused the claimed losses. While federal
district and circuit courts had heard and decided cases concerning Hurri-
cane Katrina damage, Corban v. USAA was the first opportunity for the
Mississippi Supreme Court to issue an opinion on the matter. For this rea-
son, the Corban opinion was not only important to the parties involved, it
* The author would like to thank the faculty and administration of the Mississippi College
School of Law, with special thanks to Professor Jeffrey Jackson for supervising this Note and for
encouraging me to not only analyze the court's opinion but also to question its future implications. This
case shows the difficult role that the court must play when attempting to balance the interests of victims
of natural distasters and an industry which must survive in order to help those victims. I would like to
express my appreciation for the judges who bear that burden. Lastly, none of my hard work would be
possible without the constant encouragement and support of my two daughters, Hannah and Emma,
and my parents, Molly and Bill. I am forever grateful to them for all that they do.
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also established modern Mississippi law on causation, which will affect in-
surers and insureds in future cases.
This Note details the significance of Corban as well as its similarities
and differences with other Hurricane Katrina cases. Parts II and III give
the facts and procedural history of the case. The background and history of
the law regarding the rules of contract interpretation as well as insurance
causation are explained in Part IV. Next, Part V summarizes the analysis
and reasoning applied by the Mississippi Supreme Court as it reached its
decisions on the three issues presented in the interlocutory appeal. Finally,
Part VI explains how the opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court, while
bold for its disagreement with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals over the
issue of the applicability of the ACC clause, has roots not only in cases
prior to Hurricane Katrina but also in the District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi and the Harrison County Circuit Court in post-Ka-
trina cases.
II. SUMMARY OF THE FAcS
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina slammed into the Mississippi
Gulf Coast, leaving a vast area of damage and destruction.' Magruder and
Margaret Corban's Long Beach, Mississippi, home was devastated by the
hurricane force winds and the following storm surge.2 The residential
dwelling, along with the garage, guest cottage, and other structures located
on the property, sustained damages estimated at $1,607,926.3
The Corbans' home was insured by USAA under two separate poli-
cies-a homeowner's policy and a flood policy.4 The homeowner's policy,
an all-risk policy, included an exclusion for water damage and an accompa-
nying anticoncurrent causes (ACC) clause.5 The relevant portions of the
policy stated:
1. We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by
any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any
other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any se-
quence to the loss.
1. Corban v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 20 So. 3d 601, 605 (Miss. 2009).
2. Id. at 605, 614.
3. Id. at 606.
4. Id. at 605-06.
5. Id. at 609-10, 622 (defining an "all-risk" or "all-peril" policy as one that covers losses caused
by all perils "not expressly excluded" in the policy. "Named peril" policies provide coverage only for
perils specifically listed in the policy.). See Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient Proximate Cause,
the Katrina Disaster, Prosser's Folly, and the Third Restatement of Torts: Cracking the Conundrum, 54
Lov. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (2008) (stating the insurance industry's need to exclude all correlated risks (also
referred to as calamitous perils) in "all-risk" policies in order to avoid "dwarf[ing] the resources of
insurers liable to pay for rebuilding" devastated communities after catastrophes). Corban, 20 So. 3d at
616--17 (discussing the incorporation of ACC clauses in homeowners insurance as a means to exclude
correlated risks).
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c. Water damage, meaning: (1) flood, surface water, waves,
tidal water, overflow of a body of water, or spray from any
of these, whether or not driven by wind . . . .
After filing their claim, the Corbans received the liability limits on the
flood insurance policy: $250,000 for loss to the dwelling and $100,000 for
loss to contents.' The homeowner's policy, however, required a more ex-
tensive examination than the USAA adjusters could provide.8 Retained by
the adjusters, the Haag Engineering Company (Haag) inspected the prop-
erty, specifically to establish whether the damage was caused by wind or
water.9 Because the Corbans' all-risk homeowner's policy contained an ex-
clusion for flooding, this determination was crucial.' 0
The Haag report asserted that all damage to the first floor was caused
by "flooding and wave wash."'1 Based on this report and his own follow-
up inspection, the adjuster concluded that wind was responsible only for
the damage to the roofs of the cottage and the main dwelling.12 Upon re-
ceipt of the Haag report and the adjuster's opinion, USAA issued pay-
ments to the Corbans in the amounts of $39,971.91 for "losses attributed to
wind damage," $16,955.38 for incurred living expenses, and $21,077 for per-
sonal property insured under a "personal articles floater."' 3 Also, USAA
had previously paid $5,900 for loss of valuables and refrigerated food.14
Consequently, the Corbans were left with $1,174,022.23 in unsatisfied
claimed losses.' 5
In response, the Corbans hired their own experts whose inspection es-
tablished that the hurricane winds destroyed the structures prior to the ar-
rival of the storm surge.' 6 Armed with this information and their
outstanding losses exceeding $1,000,000, the Corbans filed suit against
USAA.' 7
6. Corban, 20 So. 3d at 622.
7. Id. at 606.
8. Id.
9. Id. See Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic
Losses, 61 ALA. L. REv. 957, 968-72 (2010) (distinguishing causation in insurance law from causation in
torts law). In tort law, causation establishes fault or blame on the part of the tortfeasor and links that
fault to the resulting loss. In insurance, the "question is not 'who is to blame and why' but merely 'what
happened.' " Causation is used to determine whether "what happened" is covered under the policy
contract. The question of causation asks "whether or not the 'topic' of a contractual right is going to be
in play." Id. at 969-70.
10. Corban, at 606-07.
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III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Although the Corbans' original complaint contained actions in both
contract and tort, the parties agreed to bifurcate the claims."8 Therefore,
the Circuit Court of Harrison County heard the "insurance coverage/
breach of contract" claim separately from those of emotional distress, at-
torneys' fees, and punitive damages.19
In their complaint, the Corbans alleged that the water damage exclu-
sion and the anticoncurrent cause (ACC) clause of the homeowner's policy
were ambiguous as a matter of law.20 In its answer, USAA asserted that
certain damage was caused by water, and, accordingly, that damage was
excluded under the specific provision in the policy.2 ' Each party then filed
competing "Motions for Partial Summary Judgment" which focused on the
water damage exclusion and the ACC clause.22 While the Corbans insisted
that both were ambiguous and contrary to public policy, USAA argued
that the policy should be strictly enforced. 23
After a hearing on the motions, the court issued an "Order Granting
Partial Summary Judgment to [USAA] and Denying Partial Summary
Judgment to [the Corbans] Regarding Anticoncurrent Causation Clause
and Storm Surge Issues (With Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law)." 24
The findings of the court included: (1) storm surge, as a form of water dam-
age, was excluded from the policy; (2) the water damage exclusion and the
ACC were unambiguous; and (3) the ACC would be applied according to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals interpretation, thereby denying cover-
age for the Corbans' losses caused by any combination of wind and water,
whether concurrently or sequentially. 2 5
Upon entry of the order of the Circuit Court of Harrison County, the
Corbans filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with the Mississippi Su-
preme Court.26 After granting the petition and restating the issues, 27 the
Mississippi Supreme Court, sitting en banc, heard the arguments and issued
an opinion written by Justice Randolph, which carefully construed the in-
surance policy contract. 28
The court's analysis resulted in the following conclusions: (1) the court
held that "storm surge" was a form of water damage and, therefore, was
excluded from coverage under the policy; (2) the court rejected the Fifth
Circuit's interpretation of the ACC clause and declared it inapplicable; and
(3) because issues of material fact existed, the court established the proper
18. Id.
19. Id. at 605, 607 n.6.




24. Id. at 605.
25. Id. at 607-08.
26. Id. at 608.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 612-15.
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burdens of proof for the parties. 29 The circuit court's order was affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. 3 0
IV. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. The Appropriate Rules of Construction
It is well-settled Mississippi law that insurance policies are contracts,
and, as such, should be interpreted according to the generally accepted
rules of contract construction.3' The Mississippi Supreme Court has rea-
soned that when two parties agree on insurance coverage, as well as the
terms included in the policy contract, each party should be able to rely on
the provisions contained therein and, accordingly, expect to receive the
"benefit of their bargain."3 2
Following the first basic rule of contract construction, the unambigu-
ous words contained in an insurance policy must be read and applied ac-
cording to their plain meaning.3 Reasoning that the language of the
contract expresses the objective intent of the parties, an application of the
plain meaning rule yields an accurate and equitable result.3 4 Interpretation
by the court is necessary only if the words or provisions of the policy are
ambiguous.35 Furthermore, any ambiguities should be resolved in a man-
ner which gives the contract the most reasonable and equitable terms for
the parties involved.36
Another basic rule of contract construction compels the court to con-
sider the policy as a whole, reading the provisions all together and attempt-
ing to give meaning to each in relation to the others. If ambiguities exist,
the court must then interpret the policy "liberally in favor of the insured,
especially when interpreting exceptions and limitations."38 The Mississippi
Supreme Court referred to this as the "contra-insurer rule" which was
based on the basic contract "doctrine of omnia praesumuntur contra profer-
entem, literally meaning 'all things are presumed against the offeror.' "3
In order to decide whether interpretation is necessary, the court must
first determine whether or not an ambiguity exists in the policy.40 In
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. of Mississippi v. Martin, the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court stated that an ambiguity does not exist simply because
29. Id. at 619-20.
30. Id. at 620.
31. Noxubee Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 883 So. 2d 1159, 1166 (Miss. 2004).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1165.
34. See Simmons v. Bank of Miss., 593 So. 2d 40 (Miss. 1992).
35. Noxubee Cnty., 883 So. 2d at 1165.
36. Frazier v. Ne. Miss. Shopping Ctr., Inc., 458 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Miss. 1984).
37. J & W Foods Corp. v. State Farm, 723 So. 2d 550, 552 (Miss. 1998).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. But see Knutsen, supra note 9, at 967 (asserting that most courts see insurance contracts as
contracts of adhesion and, therefore, attempt to correct the imbalance in contracting power by constru-
ing policies as against the insurer even without finding an ambiguity).
2012]1 583
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the two parties disagree on the meaning of the policy language. 4 1 Rather,
an ambiguity exists because "the policy can be logically interpreted in two
or more ways, where one logical interpretation provides for coverage."42
The court held that because the provision in the policy was indeed ambigu-
ous, as it did not address whether overflowing sewage water fit within the
water damage exclusion, the contra-insurer rule required coverage. 43
Another occasion for ambiguity exists when two clauses or provisions
in an insurance policy are at odds. When a court must determine "whether
these two clauses of the policy can stand together; and, if they are so incon-
sistent they cannot... , which one must go down," then the issue is ambi-
guity." Because the property insurance policy in Southern Home v.
Insurance Co. v. Wall contained two provisions, one that allowed recovery
and one that denied coverage of destroyed merchandise, the court deter-
mined that the policy was ambiguous.4 5 Consequently, the clause that of-
fered coverage, the favorable outcome to the insured, prevailed.4 6
B. "Loss" as a Term in an Insurance Policy
Because the interpretation of an insurance policy ultimately deter-
mines whether coverage exists for claimed losses, the term "loss" is central
to any analysis. An insured party sustains a "loss" when damage results
from a covered event or risk.4 7 Insurance benefits vest at the time the loss
occurs.4 8 Furthermore, once a covered peril causes loss and the benefits
vest, they cannot be divested. 4 9 This concept is central to cases in which
distinguishable losses result from separate events: once the first loss occurs
and the benefits from that loss vest, a second event does not act to divest
the insured of the benefits of the first loss.50 In major catastrophes, such as
hurricanes, property may sustain "damage" that is actually a combination
of multiple losses caused by separate perils.5 1
C. Mississippi's "Efficient Proximate Cause" Doctrine
When an insurance policy does not contain a contravening clause, Mis-
sissippi's default rule on losses caused by concurrent perils is the "efficient
proximate cause" rule.5 2 As stated by the Mississippi Supreme Court, "the
41. 998 So. 2d 956, 963 (Miss. 2009).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. S. Homes Ins. Co. v. Wall, 127 So. 298, 299 (Miss. 1930).
45. Id. at 299-300.
46. Id. at 300.




51. See Parts V.B.2, VI.B.1 (discussing the difference in "loss" and "damage").
52. Evana Plantation, Inc. v'. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 58 So. 2d 797, 798 (Miss. 1952). See Knutsen,
supra note 9, at 962 (defining concurrent causation in insurance as a loss "brought about by two or
more potential causes), at 974-75 (discussing the efficient proximate cause doctrine as causing "haphaz-
ard, unpredictable jurisprudence surrounding concurrent causation in insurance" because the choice of
[VOL. 30:579584
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general rule is that, if the cause designated in the policy is the dominant
and efficient cause of the loss the right of the insurer to recover will not be
defeated by the fact that there were contributing causes."" This rule estab-
lished the proposition that if a single, distinguishable loss was caused par-
tially by a covered peril and partially by an excluded peril, the insured
could recover if the covered peril was the "efficient proximate cause" of
the loss.54
Application of this rule involved a determination not only of all possi-
ble contributing causes of the loss but also whether those causes were cov-
ered or uncovered, proximate or remote, significant or trivial.5 When
faced with a loss caused by multiple perils, the "loss certainly will be cov-
ered as long as a covered cause or peril contributes significantly, as op-
posed to trivially, to the result."5 6  While an important doctrine in
Mississippi insurance law, this default rule did not apply, however, to many
Hurricane Camille cases in which separate perils caused distinguishable
losses.57
D. Hurricane Katrina Cases Decided in Federal Courts
1. Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.5 8
The Leonards' home was damaged by wind and storm surge caused by
Hurricane Katrina, and Nationwide denied coverage for most of their claim
due to the ACC clause contained in the water damage exclusion of their
policy. 59 The District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi held
that the ACC clause was ambiguous and, consequently, the insurance pol-
icy at issue should provide coverage for losses caused by wind, which were
separate from losses attributed to water and/or storm surge.60 In reaching
a "dominant cause . . . invites equity-based 'justice' " concepts to affect the result. The inconsistent
results of litigation in which the doctrine is applied cause unpredictable coverage for insureds and un-
predictable ability to exclude coverage for insurers.).
53. Evana Plantation Inc., 58 So. 2d at 798. See Lavitt, supra note 5, at 16 (discussing the adop-
tion of some variant of the doctrine by 29 or more states and also discussing the "economic ineffi-
ciency" of the doctrine in the "conflicting and confusing state precedents" produced by application of
the doctrine).
54. Evana Plantation Inc., 58 So. 2d at 798.
55. JEFFREY JACKSON & MARY MILLER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Mississippi LAw § 40:106 (2010).
56. Id.
57. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boatner, 254 So. 2d 765, 767 (Miss. 1971). Many cases to determine
insurance coverage following Hurricane Camille did not utilize the efficient proximate cause doctrine.
Rather testimony and evidence supported findings that wind and water acted separately to cause distin-
guishable losses. Recovery was based upon these separate losses. While courts often "premised recov-
ery ... on the application of the efficient proximate cause rule, in actuality. . . , the court did little more
than uphold jury findings that the damages suffered by policyholders were caused," by wind as an
independent cause of a separate loss. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419,432-33 (5th
Cir. 2007). See Liberty Universal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 289 So. 2d 683, 684 (Miss. 1972); Lititz Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Buckley, 261 So. 2d 492, 295 (Miss. 1972); Grace v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 257 So. 2d 217, 224 (Miss.
1972); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Byrne, 248 So. 2d 765, 766 (Miss. 1971); see Lavitt, supra note 5, at
18-19 (discussing the treatment of Hurricane Camille cases by the Mississippi Supreme Court as being
fact based rather than dependent on a strict application of any rule of law).
58. 499 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2007).
59. Id. at 423-24.
60. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 693-94 (S.D. Miss. 2006)).
2012] 585
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this conclusion, the district court stated, "[u]nder applicable Mississippi
law, in a situation such as this, where the insured property sustains damage
from both wind (a covered loss) and water (an excluded loss), the insured
may recover that portion of the loss which he can prove to have been
caused by wind." 6 ' In order to determine that the ACC clause was ambigu-
ous, the court read the provision in question, as well as the policy as a
whole, to conclude that the ACC clause was not in agreement with the
overall terms of the policy and could not be conformed or interpreted in a
manner which would allow both to stand as enforceable. 6 2
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the ACC clause at issue and held
that such provisions "den[y] coverage whenever an excluded peril and a
covered peril combine to damage a dwelling or personal property."6 3 In its
correction of the Southern District's faulty reasoning, the Fifth Circuit de-
termined that insurance policies at issue in the old Hurricane Camille case
law, which served as the basis for the lower court's decision, did not contain
ACC clauses similar to the one at bar; rather, the doctrine of efficient prox-
imate cause controlled in those older cases.7 In fact, the Fifth Circuit sus-
pected that insurance companies began to include ACC clauses in
homeowner's policies in order to avoid the "efficient proximate cause"
doctrine.6 5 Because the Mississippi Supreme Court had not ruled on a
claim involving an ACC clause, no settled Mississippi law had been estab-
lished on the matter.6 6 The Fifth Circuit then made an "Erie guess"67 On
the issue and proclaimed that "the ACC clause [was] not ambiguous" and,
therefore, operated to deny coverage to the Leonards for any damage that
resulted from "wind and water [acting] synergistically." 68 In reaching this
conclusion, the Fifth Circuit did not conduct any extensive parsing of the
language of the ACC clause or make any attempts to read the provision at
61. Id. at 695. The Southern District separates damage into distinguishable losses caused sepa-
rately by wind and water.
62. Id.
63. Leonard, 499 F.3d. at 425 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit refers to "damage" rather
than to "loss."
64. Id. at 433. But see supra note 57 (discussing the Fifth Circuit acknowledgement that efficient
proximate cause did not actually apply to many holdings in Hurricane Camille cases).
65. Id. If insurance companies wrote ACC clauses in order to circumvent the efficient proximate
cause doctrine, the ACC clause would not necessarily help the insurance companies in cases in which
the doctrine was not actually applied.
66. Id. In order to make its determination of Mississippi law, the Fifth Circuit focused solely on
the lack of case law and statutes specifically addressing the ACC clause rather than explaining how the
Mississippi Supreme Court would decide the issue, what analysis the Mississippi Court would use, or
why the Mississippi Court would hold differently than the Southern District. The Fifth Circuit had
another alternative-one that would ensure an accurate assertion of Mississippi law on the matter; it
could have certified the question to the Mississippi Supreme Court.
67. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 206 (5th Cir. 2007). The Fifth Circuit
cited Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) and explained that when sitting in diversity, federal
courts must apply appropriate state substantive law. In order to determine a state's substantive law on
a matter, the Fifth Circuit consulted state common law as detennined by the state's highest court as well
as statutory law. If no such state authority existed, the Fifth Circuit then made an "Erie guess" as to
how the state high court would rule if faced with such issue.
68. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 430 (emphasis added).
586 [VOL. 30:579
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issue with regards to the policy as a whole to ensure that all terms could be
reconciled.69
After the Leonard holding, the Fifth Circuit heard other cases requir-
ing the application of Mississippi law to the issue of the propriety of ACC
clauses in Hurricane Katrina claims. 0 In those subsequent cases, the Fifth
Circuit simply applied its "Erie guess" established in Leonard and allowed
the ACC clause to defeat coverage.7 While not mandatory authority, the
Mississippi Supreme Court considers decisions of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to be persuasive when considering issues on
point.7 2 For this reason, the Fifth Circuit's decisions in Leonard and other
Katrina cases were important in the Mississippi Supreme Court's analysis
in Corban.
2. Dickinson v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. 7 3
Even after the Fifth Circuit's reversals in multiple Katrina cases, the
Southern District did not sway from its opinion that the ACC clause should
not apply to losses clearly caused by wind damage.74 In Dickinson, how-
ever, the federal district court conducted a more thorough examination of
the terms of the provision and a more extensive explanation of its applica-
tion of the rules of contract construction.7 5 Here, the court focused on the
precise wording of the ACC clause, giving particular scrutiny to "loss" and
"such loss." 76
If the "loss" in the first sentence refers to the loss caused by the ex-
cluded water damage, "such loss" in the second sentence must only refer to
that same specific water damage.7 If "such loss" is also partially caused by
a covered peril, the ACC clause applied to exclude "such loss."7" However,
if the wind caused losses, which were separate from "such losses" caused by
the storm surge, those separate losses (even if sequential), are vested and
69. Id.
70. See Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346, 352-56 (5th Cir. 2007). As in
Leonard, the Southern District held that the ACC was ambiguous and, therefore, inapplicable. The
Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the ACC clause was unambiguous and operated to deny coverage
for damage caused by wind as well as water. According to its "Erie guess," the ACC clause was applica-
ble under Mississippi law.
71. Id.
72. Bullard v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 941 So. 2d 812, 819 n.1 (Miss. 2006).
73. 2008 WL 1913957 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 25, 2008).
74. Id. at *3.
75. Id. This was basically the same result that the Fifth Circuit reversed in Leonard. In Dickin-
son, however, the Southern District did not hold the ACC clause ambiguous. Rather, the court deter-
mined that the clause did not apply because the losses caused by wind and water were separate and
distinguishable. This reasoning is very similar to Mississippi cases after Hurricane Camille. Because
the efficient proximate cause doctrine did not apply, the ACC clause also did not operate to exclude the
entire claim. Rather than making or applying an "Erie guess," the Southern District was attempting to
determine Mississippi law based on Mississippi precedent. Because the efficient proximate cause doc-
trine did not apply, the lack of ACC clauses in the Camille cases did not affect Mississippi law.
76. Id. at *2-.3.
77. Id. at *2.
78. Id.
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cannot be excluded under the ACC clause. 9 The ACC clause only oper-
ated to exclude coverage if the wind and water acted to cause indistinguish-
able loss.8 0 This holding set the stage for the Mississippi Supreme Court's
examination of the ACC clause in Corban.
E. Who Bears the Burden?
When causes of action arise from disputes over insurance coverage,
the question of who bears the burden of proof is outcome determinative
and, therefore, pivotal to the case. An all-risk policy employs a "mecha-
nism of burden-shifting as to which party bears the risk of. . . loss."8 ' Ini-
tially, the insured party bears the burden of proving that a loss occurred.8 2
If the insurance company plans to raise the affirmative defense that the loss
was caused by an excluded peril, then the burden of proof shifts to the
insurer to prove that exclusion.8 Consequently, "[u]nder this burden-shift-
ing mechanism, the insured does not need to prove the cause of the loss." 84
Both the Mississippi Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have fol-
lowed this burden shifting procedure in cases involving coverage disputes
under all-risk policies." The Fifth Circuit explained that the purpose of all-
risk insurance policies is to "protect[ ] the insured in those cases where
difficulties of logical explanation or some mystery surround the (loss or
damage to) property."8 ' Accordingly, the insured should not have to bear
the burden of proving the exact cause of the loss." If the insurance com-
pany plans to dispute coverage, the burden to show that the loss was
caused by an excluded peril falls upon the insurer.88
V. THE INSTANT CASE
After granting the Corbans' petition for interlocutory appeal, the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court restated and limited the issues for review: (1)
whether "storm surge" was included in the "water damage" exclusion; (2)
whether the ACC clause applied to the case at bar; and (3) which party
bore the burden of proof.89 The court then determined that its analysis
should consist of two steps-construing the insurance policy and then ap-
plying the policy to the specific facts of the Corban case. 90 Because "the
79. Id. at *3-4.
80. Id. at *3.




85. See Lunday v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 696, 698 (Miss. 1973); Morrison Grain Co. v.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 424, 429 (5th Cir. 1980).
86. Morrison, 632 F.2d at 430.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Corban v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n., 20 So. 3d 601, 608 (Miss. 2009).
90. Id. at 608-09.
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interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law, not one of fact,""
a de novo review was necessary. 92
A. The Rules of Contract Construction
In order to begin its analysis, the court first determined the proper
method by which to construe the policy. 93 Prior Mississippi case law de-
fined insurance policies as contracts, and therefore, the interpretation of
those policies required utilization of the basic rules of contract construc-
tion.94 Accordingly, the court considered the contract as a complete docu-
ment, determining the meaning of the actual language contained in each
provision, as well as the provisions in relation to one another in order to
"reach a reasonable overall result." 95
The court's focus was the objective interpretation of the contract's
plain language rather than the parties' unexpressed, subjective intent. 96
Furthermore, if the policy's plain language was clear and unambiguous, the
provisions would simply be applied as written. If ambiguities were found,
however, the unclear provisions would necessarily be construed in favor of
the non-drafting party according to contract law." The court defined am-
biguities as terms that yield more than one reasonable meaning; a simple
disagreement over coverage did not constitute ambiguity in the policy.99
B. Applying the Rules to the Policy
Once the proper method of analysis was identified, the court next be-
gan the actual construction of the policy in question.'" The Corbans' pol-
icy with USAA was an all-risk policy.' According to USAA, this meant,
"all risks to the structures [were] covered, other than those risks specifically
excluded from coverage."1 02 The policy contained a provision excluding
"water damage," and this exclusion also contained the ACC clause cur-
rently contested. 103 Both parties agreed that while damage caused by wind
was covered under the policy, the damage caused by water was excluded.104
Because the losses resulting from Hurricane Katrina consisted of both wind










100. Id. at 610.
101. Id. at 609.
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and water damage, the water damage exclusion and the ACC clause were
at issue in the determination of coverage. 0 5
1. The Issue of Storm Surge
The court first considered the issue of "storm surge" as it related to the
"water damage" exclusion.10 6 The Corbans claimed that "storm surge" was
not water damage because the policy did not specifically list "storm surge"
among the various meanings included in the water damage exclusion.10 7
Accordingly, the court conducted an extensive examination of storm
surge.'0 8 As persuasive authority, the court considered the cases of Leo-
nard and Tuepker, as well as other Hurricane Katrina litigation, in which
the Southern District and the Fifth Circuit both determined that storm
surge was included in the "water damage" exclusions of various insurance
policies.' 09 The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the lower "court's rul-
ing that 'storm surge' is contained unambiguously within the water damage
exclusion . . . , and no other logical interpretation exists.""1
0
2. The Issue of the ACC Clause
The court then considered the second issue-whether the ACC clause
in the "water exclusion" applied to the Corbans' claim."' Before begin-
ning its own analysis, the court referred to the lower court's examination of
the ACC clause.112
a. The Harrison County Circuit Court's Analysis
The Harrison County Circuit Court determined that the logical read-
ing of the ACC clause was an unambiguous exclusion of losses caused only
by water damage, regardless of whether that water damage was in combi-
nation with or in sequence with other causes.113 When the circuit court
read the provision in a "plain, common-sense" manner, the way in which
"average citizens are expected to read and understand," it concluded that
the ACC clause was unambiguous and intended to only exclude the loss
caused by water damage.114
In an analysis very similar to that of the Southern District in Dickin-
son, the Harrison County Circuit Court paid particular attention to the
word "loss" in the first sentence of the ACC clause and the phrase "such





109. Id. at 610-11.
110. Id at 611 (citing United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Martin, 998 So. 2d 956, 963 (Miss. 2008)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 611-12 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 611.
115. Id. at 611-12.
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The term 'such loss' can only refer to the loss caused by
water damage mentioned in the first sentence of the exclu-
sion. It is that loss and that loss only that is excluded by the
plain language of the provision. . .. This simple, basic inter-
pretation of the language used and sentence structure used
bars coverage for water damage and only the water damage,
whether occurring alone or in any order with another
cause. 116
If losses were caused by perils separate and distinct from "such loss"
caused by water, those separate losses were compensable-only the water
damage was excluded.' 7
This interpretation of the ACC clause favored the Corbans; it allowed
coverage of wind damage while excluding only water damage." 8 As long
as the two forces were acting individually, wind damage, whether occurring
simultaneously or in sequence with water, would be covered under the pol-
icy.19 Rather than applying its own construction of the ACC clause, how-
ever, the Harrison County court deferred to the persuasive holdings of the
Fifth Circuit in Leonard and Tuepker.1'2 0 In those cases, the Fifth Circuit
applied similar ACC clauses to claims resulting from Hurricane Katrina
damage, thereby denying coverage to any damage resulting from wind and
water acting "synergistically" to cause the same damage.121
b. The Mississippi Supreme Court Construes the ACC Clause
Next, the court began its own analysis of the ACC clause by stating the
exact words of the provision, emphasizing the words to be scrutinized in its
construction:
1. We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by
any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any
other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any se-
quence to the loss.122
The words "loss," "concurrently," and "in any sequence" were the signifi-
cant words in the exclusion and accompanying ACC clause, and conse-
quently, the court analyzed each according to its plain meaning.'23
Because the policy did not specifically define these words, the court fol-
lowed the generally accepted rules of contract construction: (1) consider
how the words were utilized elsewhere in the policy; and (2) determine
116. Id.






123. Id. at 612-13.
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their ordinary and popular meaning.124 The court accomplished this by ex-
amining the policy provisions and by looking in Webster's II New College
Dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary, as well as other sources. 125
i. The "Loss"
The court reasoned that "loss" occurs at the point in time when the
property sustains damage or destruction.126 Additionally, the right to re-
cover attaches when the loss is actually incurred. 12 7 Once loss occurs due
to one type of damage, whether included or excluded, that loss is not
changed by any subsequent damage.128 Therefore, once a loss is caused by
an included damage, that loss cannot be excluded by subsequent dam-
age.12 9 The court determined "[t]he insured's right to be indemnified for a
covered loss vests at time of loss. Once the duty to indemnify arises, it
cannot be extinguished by a successive cause or event."130 Hence, the pol-
icy allowed recovery for all "direct, physical loss" to the property unless
such loss was covered by an enumerated exclusion.' 3 '
The court also explained the difference between the terms "damage"
(as used by the Fifth Circuit in Leonard) and "loss" as terms in insurance
law.132 The court quoted APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE and stated, "Loss to
property can consist of many losses . . . and 'loss' need not refer only to the
totality of the damage and in fact should not when different forces have
caused different damage."13 3 The losses caused by wind and water should
be segregated and not considered together as a single instance of property
damage.134
ii. "Concurrently"
Looking next at "concurrently," the court considered whether perils
that coexist, such as wind and water in a hurricane, were necessarily ex-
cluded under the ACC clause.'3 5 Upon consideration of the plain meaning
derived from the various definitions, the court decided that events may
only be "concurrent" when they "act in conjunction, as an indivisible force,
occurring at the same time, to cause direct physical damage resulting in
loss. "136
124. Id.





130. Id. (citing Bland v. Bland, 629 So. 2d 582, 589 (Miss. 1993)).
131. Id. at 614.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE I 192.03[H] (2009) (emphasis added by the Court).
134. Id.
135. Id. (The Court first concluded that the policy did not, as the Corbans claimed, specifically
cover hurricane damage. The policy addressed the separate damages caused by a hurricane, including
wind while excluding water.).
136. Id.
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Applying the definition to the case, the losses sustained by the Cor-
bans were not caused by the forces of wind and water acting "concurrently"
or as an indivisible force.' 37 Rather, the wind and the water constituted
two separate forces acting in sequence with one another causing distinct
losses.138 Because the wind and water did not act "contemporaneously and
in conjunction," they could not be "concurrent" causes under the ACC
clause.139
iii. "In Any Sequence" Is Ambiguous
The court then considered the phrase "in any sequence" to mean "se-
quentially" for the purpose of determining the plain meaning.14 0 This
wording of the ACC clause implied that a covered loss, which vested at the
time of occurrence, could then be divested by an excluded loss, which oc-
curred in sequence.14 ' The court determined that the "in any sequence"
phrasing operated to contradict the plain meaning of "loss" as well as other
policy provisions that establish when losses vest. 142 Because of this conflict
within the language and provisions of the policy, the court determined that
an ambiguity existed and, therefore, the provision favoring the insured
should be enforced.143 In this particular case, the ACC clause's "in any
sequence" language was not enforced because it would operate to cancel a
covered loss.14 4
iv. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding on the ACC Clause
Issue
The court's analysis concluded that the lower court's construction of
the water damage exclusion and the accompanying ACC clause was
proper-loss from water damage could be excluded "regardless of any
other cause or event [wind damage] contributing concurrently or in any
sequence to the loss [from water damage]." 145 Hence, the policy excluded
only water damage unless the water and wind acted "concurrently" as de-
fined by the court as "contemporaneously and in conjunction." 146 Because
the wind and water in a hurricane usually act as separate and distinct forces
causing separate damages, the policy's ACC clause cannot allow a covered
loss caused by wind damage to become an excluded loss when followed
sequentially by water damage.147
137. Id.
138. Id. at 614-15.




143. Id. at 615-16.
144. Id. at 616.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Id.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
The court then cited Dickinson, in which the Southern District found
that wind damage was covered by a Nationwide policy whereas any water
damage was excluded.'48 The Dickinson court held that "the anticoncur-
rent cause provision is not applicable and does not come into play because
each force causes its own separate damage independent of the damage
caused by the other even when the same item of property is damaged by
both forces acting separately and sequentially."14 9 Accordingly, the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court held that the ACC clause did not apply in this case.150
The Corbans' losses attributed to wind were covered under their USAA
policy, while those damages caused by water or "storm surge" were
excluded.' 5 '
In so holding, the court "respectfully rejected" the reasoning of the
Fifth Circuit as expressed in the Tuepker and Leonard opinions.152 The
Mississippi Supreme Court again emphasized the correct construction of
the water damage exclusion and the ACC clause by the lower court and its
error in rejecting its own interpretation in favor of the "Fifth Circuit's 'Erie
guess' regarding its application." 1 5 3
c. The Burden of Proof Issue
Because a finder of fact must determine which losses were caused by
wind and which caused by water, the court next determined who bore the
burden of proof.154 Initially, the insureds had to prove that damages actu-
ally occurred.' 55 Then, if the insurer presented the affirmative defense that
the losses were caused by an excluded peril, the insurer carried the burden
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the excluded peril was
indeed the cause of the loss.156
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the Harrison County Circuit
Court's holding on the issue of "storm surge" but reversed on the applica-
bility of the ACC clause to the Corbans' claim.'s 7 The case was remanded
with the proper burden of proof established for the finder of fact.' 58
VI. ANALYSIS
The Corban opinion is significant for multiple reasons. Not only did
the Mississippi Supreme Court decide the contested issues in the Corbans'
dispute with USAA, it also corrected the Fifth Circuit's "Erie guess" and
established new Mississippi law. Perhaps more significant than the holding
148. Id.




153. Id. at 618.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 619.
157. Id.
158. Id at 619-20.
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itself, the implications of this new law are substantial, and many questions
remain in the wake of the opinion.
A. The Mississippi Supreme Court Is in Harmony with
Other Courts Regarding Storm Surge
Although the Corbans claimed that storm surge losses were covered,
the Mississippi Supreme Court easily determined that the water damage
exclusion applied to storm surge. 159 The fact that storm surge was not spe-
cifically enumerated in the water damage exclusion did not automatically
provide coverage.'6o Without extensive parsing of the provision or resort-
ing to dictionaries, a simple application of the plain meaning rule deter-
mined that the term "storm surge" was unambiguous and easily included in
the water damage exclusion.' 61 Also in its analysis, the court referred to
previous Mississippi cases holding that storm surge was an unambiguous
term, included in water damage exclusions even if not specifically
enumerated. 162
This was a perfectly logical outcome. While the words "storm surge"
were not specifically stated in the policy language, the largely agreed upon
definition of storm surge was synonymous with "water damage." To allow
coverage here would defeat USAA's clear intention of exclusion. This out-
come also demonstrates that the Mississippi Supreme Court did not disa-
gree with the Fifth Circuit on all issues of the Katrina cases. The
Mississippi Supreme Court was not merely attempting to be contrary;
rather, it had a legitimate disagreement with the Fifth Circuit's holding
concerning the ACC clause.
B. The Court Interprets the ACC Clause and Formulates
Mississippi Law
While the Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit
over the applicability of the ACC clause, the opinion was certainly not
unique. Both the Harrison County Circuit Court and the Southern District
had already held that the ACC clause did not apply to these types of losses;
however, those courts used different analyses and explanations to arrive at
the same ultimate conclusion.' 63 The Southern District's analysis in Dick-
inson was particularly important; both the Harrison County Circuit Court
159. Id. at 610-11. In reaching this decision, the Court considered the holdings of the Fifth Circuit
in Leonard and Tuepker. These holding were merely affirmations of the Southern District's careful
determination that storm surge was a form of water damage unique to hurricanes.
160. Id. The Harrison County Circuit Court correctly ascertained that the very definition of storm
surge-"ocean or lake water being pushed by or affected by wind causing the water to rise and move
toward or onto shore"-made it fit into the water damage exclusion, even if it was not listed therein.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See supra Parts IV.D.2, V.B.2 (discussing the examination of ACC clauses by the Southern
District and the Harrison County Circuit Court).
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and the Mississippi Supreme Court expounded upon its discussion of "loss"
and "such loss" in their respective Corban opinions.164
Because this approach had been taken by both the federal district
court and the lower court, the Corban decision was not a novel or unjusti-
fied rebuke of the Fifth Circuit. Rather, the opinion demonstrated that the
Mississippi Supreme Court legitimately disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's
"Erie guess" and took the opportunity to establish Mississippi case law to
displace it. Not only did the court disagree with the Fifth Circuit, it ex-
plained in great detail how it disagreed. 65 TO that end, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court combined methods employed by other courts with its own
careful analysis to craft a thorough explanation of its opinion. 1 6 6
Rather than simply holding the ACC clause ambiguous and, therefore,
inapplicable, the Mississippi Supreme Court conducted an extensive exami-
nation of the wording of the provision. 16 In order to establish the plain
meaning of the terms, the court consulted legal and layman dictionaries as
well as the definitions contained in the policy.16 8 Furthermore, to deter-
mine whether ambiguities existed, the provisions of the policy were read as
a whole.169 By conducting such an extensive examination, the Mississippi
Supreme Court did not merely proclaim Mississippi law; it provided an
explanation.
1. The Importance of the Distinction Between "Loss" and "Damage"
In an attempt to justify its opposition to the Fifth Circuit, the court
explained the difference between "loss" (the term contained in the ACC
clause) and the term "damage" (used by the Fifth Circuit).' 70 Once a prop-
erty sustains a loss caused by wind, that vested loss cannot subsequently be
converted to a different loss by water.1 7 ' Even though the property sus-
tains "damage" caused by both wind and water, if the two forces are acting
at two different times or as two separate forces, then two distinct losses vest
at the time each occurs.172 Furthermore, the loss caused by the covered
peril must be indemnified; it cannot be cancelled out by any subsequent
loss, even if that loss is caused by an excluded peril.173
This means that a loss caused by wind cannot be converted to a loss
caused by water simply because the water arrives after or separately from
the wind. For the ACC clause to apply, "the loss," as referenced in the
language of the clause, must be a single loss caused by the excluded peril of
164. See supra Parts IV.D.2, v.B.2.
165. See supra Part V.B.2 (detailing the extensive analysis of the ACC clause by the Mississippi
Supreme Court).
166. See supra Part V.B.2.
167. See supra Part V.B.2.
168. See supra Part V.B.2.
169. See supra Part V.B.2.
170. Corban v. United Sen's. Auto Ass'n, 20 So. 3d 601, 612-14 (Miss. 2009).
171. Id.
172. Id
173. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the significance of the definition of "loss" in insurance law).
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water in combination with another peril that would normally be covered
under the policy."' A catastrophic event, such as a hurricane, is capable of
major property "damage," but that damage may be a combination of multi-
ple separate "losses" caused by different perils, some of which are covered
while others are excluded.17 5 Thus, while the ultimate "damage" may be
difficult to separate into individual losses, according to the Corban opinion,
the determination must be made in order to indemnify the policy-holder
adequately.
While this distinction between loss and damage is clearly important in
the court's analysis, the actual segregation of property damage into distinct
losses will be difficult.17 6 Compounding the problem, the lack of witnesses
makes the separation of losses even more troublesome. When the threat of
a hurricane forces the residents to evacuate, the property sustains the dam-
age while no one is present to see how it actually occurs. Once the home-
owner returns to find the home damaged or destroyed, this determination
must be made during the extremely stressful circumstances found in the
aftermath of a hurricane's devastating effects.
2. The Definition of "Concurrently" Constricts the Application of the
ACC Clause
While the Dickinson court's analysis centered on the meaning of loss,
the Mississippi Supreme Court carried its examination of the language and
terms of the provision much further. Next, in its scrutiny of the term "con-
currently," the court stated that two perils acting "as an indivisible force,
occurring at the same time, to cause direct physical damage resulting in
loss" would be concurrent causes to which the ACC clause would apply. 7 7
A single loss, concurrently caused by two "contemporaneously" occurring
perils, would be excluded by the ACC clause.178 The court's emphasis on
the convergence of the two causes at exactly the same time is a very restric-
tive definition of concurrent. Using this definition, storm surge may pro-
vide an example of a truly concurrent cause. It is the unique combination
of the forces of wind and water driven ashore during a hurricane; the two
perils cannot be distinguished or separated, and they cause an indivisible
loss. 179
Also important in its explanation of "concurrently," the court explains
when the ACC clause does apply. If a single loss is truly caused by concur-
rent perils, then the ACC clause does indeed act to exclude the loss from
coverage.1 80 The court did not declare the entire ACC clause ambiguous,
nor it did hold that the ACC clause is unconscionable or in all instances
174. Corban, 20 So. 3d at 613-14.
175. Id. at 616.
176. See Knutsen, supra note 9, at 998-1008 (discussing the difficulty of differentiating losses
caused during a catastrophic event).
177. Corban, 20 So. 3d. at 614.
178. Id. at 614-15.
179. See supra notes 159, 160 (describing and defining storm surge).
180. Corban, 20 So. 3d at 614-15.
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inapplicable. Although finding two perils acting concurrently, by its re-
strictive definition, may prove difficult, the court made certain that a loss
sustained due to concurrent causes, one of which is excluded in the policy,
will not be covered under the ACC clause.18'
By allowing the "concurrently" portion of the ACC clause to avoid
coverage of a single loss caused contemporaneously by two or more perils,
the court does allow the ACC clause to counteract the efficient proximate
cause doctrine. By not striking the entire clause or declaring it ambiguous
in its entirety, the Mississippi Supreme Court allows the insurance com-
pany to contract around the Mississippi default rule.' 8 2 In instances where
an application of efficient proximate cause would determine that a covered
peril was the dominant cause of a single loss and allow coverage, the ACC
clause, if present in the policy, would defeat such coverage.
Here again, the importance of the court's distinction between "loss"
and "damage" becomes important. When forced to examine the individual
"losses" which combine to cause the property "damage" in a hurricane, the
efficient proximate cause rule and the insurance company's attempt to
avoid that rule become less applicable. According to the court, the "dam-
age" cannot be considered in its entirety, but rather, it must be separated
into "losses."' 8 3 This greatly decreases the effect of the ACC clause. By
emphasizing individual losses, the court allows a portion of the ACC clause
to remain in the policy but greatly reduces its application. This decision
leads to further questions: Does this really help the insurance company in
its attempt to reduce its correlated risk and exclude the catastrophic dam-
age caused by hurricanes? By constricting the application so severely, does
the court in effect take the insurance company's freedom to contract with-
out saying so?
3. "In any sequence"-Ambiguous or Against Public Policy?
Finally, the Mississippi Supreme Court examined "in any sequence"
and determined that the phrase is synonymous with the word "sequen-
tially."184 After examining several other provisions contained within the
policy, the court asserted that an ambiguity existed, and, therefore, the
phrase must be construed in favor of the insured.' 8  The conflicting policy
provisions stated that any sustained loss was vested at the time the loss
occurred; moreover, the property's value was to be determined at the time
181. Id.
182. See supra Part V.C (discussing the efficient proximate cause doctrine in Mississippi). See
Knutsen, supra note 9, at 974-77, 982 (discussing the inefficiency and unpredictability of the efficient
proximate cause doctrine), at 995-97 (discussing that while insurance companies attempt to overcome
the unpredictability of the efficient proximate cause doctrine by including ACC clauses in policies, the
unpredictable enforcement of the clauses by the courts makes this an inefficient solution to the
problem).
183. See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing the Court's distinction between "damage" and "loss").
184. Id. (explaining the definition of "in any sequence").
185. Id.
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of loss or immediately prior to the loss. 186 In order to enforce these provi-
sions, no sustained, vested loss can be divested by a sequentially occurring
cause or peril.' 87 In this particular case, no vested loss caused by a covered
peril-wind-can be subsequently excluded simply because the same prop-
erty suffers a sequential loss caused by water. The initial loss still exists and
must be covered, no matter what happens in sequence to it.
In this portion of the analysis, the Mississippi Supreme Court strays
from the Harrison County court and from the Southern District's Dickin-
son opinion. Neither court struck down any portion of the ACC clause as
ambiguous; rather, each court found that the ACC clause did not apply due
to two separate perils causing distinguishable losses.'8 8 Here, by holding
that the "in any sequence" portion of the ACC clause was indeed ambigu-
ous, the Mississippi Supreme Court struck down the portion of the provi-
sion most beneficial to the insurer while upholding the portion most
favorable to the insured.189 Neither the lower court nor the Southern Dis-
trict had recognized that the "in any sequence" language could not be rec-
onciled with the concept of a single loss referenced in the ACC clause.' 90 If
a covered peril caused a loss, a sequentially occurring (excluded) peril
could not extinguish that existing loss. The two concepts of "vested loss"
and "in any sequence" could not be reconciled, and, therefore, an ambigu-
ity did indeed exist.
If, however, the insurance company intended for the definition of
"loss" to be more akin to the Mississippi Supreme Court's idea of "dam-
age," the use of "in any sequence" in the clause could be reconciled within
the policy. The holding of "in any sequence" as ambiguous would defeat
the insurance company's attempt to exclude coverage for sequential causes
of a more broadly defined "loss." The court's narrow definition of loss and
its striking of the "in any sequence" phrasing seem to indicate an unwilling-
ness to allow insurers to completely contract around sequential losses,
which are characteristically present in property damage caused by a hurri-
cane.19' Rather than an examination of terms to determine ambiguity, the
Corban opinion may be asserting new policy-Mississippi's refusal to allow
186. Corban v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 20 So. 3d 601, 615 (Miss. 2009).
187. Id. at 615-16.
188. See supra Parts IV.D.2, V.B.2 (discussing the analysis of the ACC clause by the Southern
District and the Harrison County Circuit Court).
189. "In any sequence" is potentially beneficial to the insurer because a court could interpret it to
allow coverage for "damage" caused by wind acting first and water then acting "sequentially" on the
same property. Also, because it allows for different interpretations, it is more difficult to apply with
uniformity. "Concurrently" is favorable to the insured, due to the Court's narrow definition, leading to
a limited application to exclude coverage. The Court's definition is easy to understand and, conse-
quently, a more uniform application is possible.
190. See supra Parts IV.D.2, V.B.2 (discussing the analysis of the ACC clause by the Southern
District and the Harrison County Circuit Court).
191. See Lavitt, supra note 5, at 1-7 (discussing the natural combination and sequence of losses in
catastrophic events such as hurricanes); see Knutsen, supra note 9, at 1001-06 (discussing the difficulties
in determining causation in losses caused by perils occurring in sequence).
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insurance companies to contract around sequential causation.'92 If the in-
surance industry does not have the freedom to contract around certain
risks, insurers may feel the need to leave the market rather than be forced
to insure risks that they intend to exclude. 193
Because of the unique nature of a hurricane, in which the winds may
arrive days before the storm surge and consequent flooding, the Mississippi
Supreme Court tailored its opinion to assure that the ACC clause did not
apply in such circumstances of sequential losses. The holding provides that
insurance companies cannot define a hurricane as a single event which
causes indivisible "hurricane losses" due to wind and water acting in se-
quence.194 The winds and storm surge did not occur concurrently, accord-
ing to the court's definition." By holding "in any sequence" ambiguous,
any argument by an insurer that a loss was caused by wind and water acting
sequentially is precluded.1 9 6 The hurricane winds caused a loss that vested
prior to the arrival of the storm surge. Any subsequent loss caused by that
storm surge was excluded due to the water damage exclusion provision, but
the ACC clause could not serve as a mechanism to divest the Corbans' of
the previously vested losses due to wind.
4. Implications of the Corban Holding on the ACC Clause
By conducting the extensive analysis of the terms of the ACC clause in
question, as well as a thorough reading of the policy as a whole, the court
took the time and effort necessary to explain its conclusion. The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court did not merely disagree with the Fifth Circuit's "Erie
guess," it provided the reasoning behind its disagreement. The ACC clause
was not simply declared ambiguous or inapplicable as a whole; rather, the
court explained when it could operate to exclude losses caused by truly
concurrent causes and what portion of the provision was subject to diver-
gent meanings and, consequently, ambiguous.
Whether its extensive analysis and narrow definitions are essentially a
statement by the court that Mississippi public policy will not allow freedom
of contract for the insurance industry still looms for the future. If insurance
companies respond to this opinion with new provisions and broader defini-
tions of terms within the policy designed to exclude the types of sequential
losses caused by hurricanes, the court will once again be required to settle
192. See JEFFREY JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 15:19 (2010) (discussing
the implications of Corban and the possibility that the opinion may be an assertion of public policy
against excluding sequentially caused losses).
193. See Lavitt, supra note 5, at 5-7 (discussing the importance of maintaining equilibrium in the
insurance market by allowing insurance companies the freedom to draft policies excluding correlated
risks).
194. Corban v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 20 So. 3d 601, 617 (Miss. 2009).
195. Id. at 614-15.
196. Id. at 617.
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the accompanying disputes. Because insurance companies react to new ju-
dicial opinions with new policy provisions, insureds will encounter new pro-
visions in their policies that attempt to exclude coverage. 197 Courts will
once again be faced with balancing sympathy for victims of catastrophic
events with the economic interests of the insurance industry.
Also noteworthy, the Mississippi Supreme Court did not rely on the
"efficient proximate cause doctrine" in its analysis. The Fifth Circuit's
analysis of the "efficient proximate cause" doctrine, while an accurate ex-
planation of the default rule in Mississippi and its neutralization by the
ACC clause, was not exactly on point, if it was an attempt to show why
Mississippi did not have established, applicable hurricane case law.198
Even in prior Hurricane Camille cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court did
not apply "efficient proximate cause" in cases in which the wind and tidal
surge operated to cause separate losses.199 Rather, "efficient proximate
cause"l analysis was used for those instances when a single loss was the
result of multiple perils acting in concert with one another.200
By focusing on "loss" and the separate nature of losses caused by wind
and water in a hurricane event, an application of the "efficient proximate
cause" doctrine was not required. In keeping with the court's definition of
"concurrent," if the losses caused by wind and water were indeed separate
and distinguishable, there was no need to apply "efficient proximate
cause." 2 0 1 The Mississippi Supreme Court could have simply stated that
the separate losses caused by wind and water did not require an application
of efficient proximate cause and, therefore, the ACC clause did not apply.
In other words, the court could have avoided an interpretation of the ACC
clause altogether. Due to the Fifth Circuit's "Erie guess" on the matter,
however, the court was obligated to examine the ACC clause and establish
Mississippi law on the issue.
This newly established law did not strike down ACC clauses but also
did not allow insurance companies to exclude all hurricane "damage"
which could be caused by separate wind and water losses. The opinion
appears to be an attempt to strike a balance between the homeowner's
need to recover a greater portion of their losses and the interests of the
insurance industry to contract around default rules. Upon a closer look,
however, the court permits a very limited opportunity to apply the unam-
biguous portion of the ACC clause in hurricane-damage situations. This
holding also creates other issues in need of resolution: did this establish a
new default rule which does not allow exclusion of sequential losses, and
will the court allow the insurance industry to contract around that rule? If
197. See JACKSON, supra note 192, at § 15:19 (explaining the attempts by insurance companies to
draft policies in order to contract around judicial decisions).
198. See supra Part IV.C; see supra note 57.
199. See supra Part IV.C; see supra note 57.
200. See supra Part IV.C; see supra note 57.
201. See supra Part IV.C; see supra note 57.
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the court is attempting to bar exclusion of sequential damages, the insur-
ance industry may respond by leaving the gulf coast market.20 2
C. The Difficult Burden for the Insurance Company
Because the ACC clause did not operate to exclude losses attributable
to wind damage, it was necessary to establish which party must bear the
burden of proof in the subsequent action. The Mississippi Supreme Court
did not break any new ground on this issue. Rather, well-established insur-
ance law was called upon to provide the necessary guidelines. As in previ-
ous cases involving "all-risk" insurance policies, the insured party must first
prove that a compensable loss occurred.2 0 3 Then, if the insurer asserts the
affirmative defense that the loss was caused by an excluded peril, the bur-
den falls on the insurer to prove the exclusion by a preponderance of the
evidence.204
Here, the Corbans must simply demonstrate that a loss occurred to
their property insured by USAA under their all-risk policy.2 05 Then, if
USAA claims that part or all of the loss was caused by water damage,
USAA must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the loss was not
caused by wind but rather by water, acting either alone or concurrently
with the wind.206 Due to the nature and magnitude of damage and destruc-
tion caused by a hurricane, such determinations will not be quick or easy.
With such a large amount of money at stake, both parties have much to
lose, and, consequently, litigation over these claims could become pro-
tracted and expensive.207
The court's holding that the ACC clause did not apply to divisible
losses caused by separate perils did not establish a decisive victory for the
Corbans or defeat for USAA. Due to the difficulties involved in separating
"property damage" into separate losses attributed to distinct perils, how-
ever, the insurance company faces a heavy burden to avoid coverage. This
holding, therefore, presents USAA with formidable obstacles in any at-
tempt to meet the burden of proving which losses were caused by wind,
water, or a concurrent combination of the two. Because the burden falls on
the insurance company, the insured is in a much better position to collect
on their claims.
202. See JACKSON, supra note 192, at § 15:19.
203. See supra Part IV.F (discussing the burden of proof in insurance claims and the insurer's
burden to prove the affirmative defense of a loss being excluded in the policy).
204. See supra Part V.F.
205. See supra Part V.B.3.
206. See supra Part V.B.3.
207. See Lavitt, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing the stakes involved in cases involving insurance
coverage of catastrophic events); see Knutsen, supra note 9, at 978-81 (discussing the expense of causa-
tion litigation).
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One suggested solution for such difficulties in proving causation is to
follow an apportionment rule.208 Where damage is caused by multiple per-
ils, each peril is assigned a percentage of the damage, and the property
owner recovers for the portion of the damage covered under the policy.20 9
For a hypothetical hurricane, the different elements of wind, storm surge,
etc. would be assigned certain percentages of total damage (taking into ac-
count the particular meteorological variables determined for the particular
hurricane as well as the different areas affected, varying the percentages in
different zones).210 If 20% of the total damage in the homeowner's zone
were apportioned to wind alone, then the homeowner would be indemni-
fied for 20% of the total damage sustained. This method would lighten the
burden for the insurance company and allow for easier claim settlement. 211
Apportionment would also allow for more certainty in insurance litigation,
which would lead to greater judicial administrative economy. 2 1 2
VII. CONCLUSION
Insurance companies have every right to formulate their own policies.
Furthermore, insurance purchasers have a duty to read their policies in or-
der to know what is covered. When those policies contain provisions,
which purchasers cannot understand even when they do read them, and
phrases with several possible meanings, the court must ensure that each
party obtains a fair outcome when disputes arise over coverage. Because
the insurance industry is regulated largely through state law, federal courts
sitting in diversity must apply state law to these types of disputes. Con-
stantly changing policies yield situations in which states may not have es-
tablished law on the most current issues, and consequently, federal courts
may make an "Erie guess" as to what the appropriate state law will be.
After several such guesses by the Fifth Circuit, Corban v. USAA pro-
vided the Mississippi Supreme Court the opportunity to disagree with the
Fifth Circuit and to establish Mississippi law regarding insurance policies
containing ACC clauses. For this reason, the Corban opinion is ground-
breaking; however, the reasoning behind the opinion is by no means ex-
traordinary. The Mississippi Supreme Court relied upon the same logical
analysis from years ago: if separate losses are caused by separate perils,
they are not concurrent, and the insurance company must indemnify for
covered losses. Any underlying, unstated meaning of the opinion, as well
as any future implications, are yet to be fully realized.
208. See Knutsen, supra note 9, at 977-86, 1010-12 (discussing the apportionment approach to
concurrent causation and the need for consistency to lower the cost and increase the efficiency of insur-
ance litigation).
209. Id.
210. This is a hypothetical application of Knutsen's apportionment discussion.
211. See Knutsen, supra note 9, at 977-86, 1010-12.
212. Id. (discussing the benefits of apportionment, but also stating that no jurisdiction has adopted
such an approach to concurrent causation).
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